he Peasants' Cognition and The Level of Informal Constraints and The Rural Land Institutional Change in China —Analysis and simulation based on dynamic evolutionary game model

Abstract

The peasants' cognition and informal constraints are important factors that affect the rural land institutional change in China. By constructing a dynamic evolutionary game model and conducting simulation analysis, this paper finds that the individual cognition of peasants affects the strategic choice of them, and then affects the direction of the rural land institutional change in China, which is the endogenous power of institutional change; Informal constraints are hierarchical and affect the speed of institutional change. The higher the level of informal constraints, the faster the speed of institutional change. Based on the above conclusions, this paper proposes to adhere to the road of gradual reform, carry out multi-party research activities, and improve peasants' cognition; Clarify the main status of f peasants in the reform and create an organizational form with them as the main core; Give rights to the rural grass-roots democratic autonomy, and form broad binding informal constraints.